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World knowledge influences how we perceive the world. This study shows that this influence is at least
partly mediated by declarative memory. Dutch and German participants categorized hues from a
yellow-to-orange continuum on stimuli that were prototypically orange or yellow and that were also
associated with these color labels. Both groups gave more “yellow” responses if an ambiguous hue
occurred on a prototypically yellow stimulus. The language groups were also tested on a stimulus (traffic
light) that is associated with the label orange in Dutch and with the label yellow in German, even though
the objective color is the same for both populations. Dutch observers categorized this stimulus as orange
more often than German observers, in line with the assumption that declarative knowledge mediates the
influence of world knowledge on color categorization.
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Observers tend to perceive the world in accordance with their
expectations. A yellow–orange hue is more likely to be catego-
rized as orange on a carrot than on a banana (Mitterer & de Ruiter,
2008). A face is perceived to be lighter if it contains prototypical
White features rather than Black ones (Levin & Banaji, 2006). A
speech sound that could be /t/ or /d/ is perceived as /d/ in _ash but
as /t/ in _ask (Ganong, 1980; Warren, 1970). A slightly ambiguous
letter—such as an H in which the two vertical lines are tilted
inward—is perceived as A if it occurs in C_T but as H if it occurs
in T_E (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). These object-based
biases are useful for the observer, because perceptual evidence in
the real world tends to be less than perfect. The light reflected from
a banana depends strongly on the lighting source; speech sounds
can be masked by ambient noise; and careless handwriting can blur
the distinctions between different letters. When faced with ambi-
guity, the observer is going to be right more often than wrong
when assuming that a banana really is yellow—at least when in a
supermarket.
There is a longstanding debate concerning whether such biases
show a top-down flow of information. Undoubtedly, an interactive
activation and inhibition account elegantly explains how we per-
ceive the world in line with world knowledge (McClelland &
Elman, 1986; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). The two left panels
in Figure 1 show such an architecture. Information from perception
is fed forward to memory, and the content of memory then directly
influences how the stimulus is perceived. Consider the _ash versus
_ask example above. The words dash and task, respectively, fit the
perceptual evidence best because tash and dask are not words in
English. Lexical activation from the real words feeds back to the
phoneme-perception units. This feedback then boosts activation
for the /t/ unit when the input is _ask, which in turn inhibits the /d/
unit. As a consequence, /t/ is more strongly activated than /d/ in
response to the stimulus _ask. This explains why listeners hear a /t/
more often in _ask than in _ash. Such top-down feedback may help
us overcome the immense variability that we face in perception,
like the invariance problem in speech perception (Liberman, 1996)
or the color-constancy problem in visual perception (Brainard,
2004).
Skeptics, however, have argued that feedback from a lexical to
a prelexical level is not necessary to explain how world knowledge
biases perceptual categorization (Massaro, 1998; Norris,
McQueen, & Cutler, 2000). According to this alternative account,
when a listener is confronted with input such as _ask, he or she just
has to weigh the perceptual evidence (which is ambiguous) against
the lexical evidence (which indicates a /t/) to arrive at the decision
that there was a /t/ and not a /d/ in the input. That is, the perceptual
evidence and the world knowledge are merged to arrive at a
perceptual decision. This alternative model is depicted in the two
right panels of Figure 1. Note that there is no direct feedback from
memory on perceptual processes. In support of this view, Frauen-
felder and Peeters (1998) found that top-down feedback is—in
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contrast to the general intuition—not a useful tool for perception to
overcome the variability that perception faces. Frauenfelder and
Peeters showed that an interaction–activation model of word rec-
ognition (TRACE model; McClelland & Elman, 1986) works just
as efficiently when top-down connections are removed.
To distinguish these two accounts—feedback to perceptual en-
coding versus merging at perceptual decision—recently research-
ers have moved to procedures in which recruitment of explicit
knowledge is thought unlikely to be involved, thus potentially
ruling out a merging account. For example, in color perception,
Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, and Gegenfurtner (2006) asked partic-
ipants to change the hue of an object—by pressing one of four
buttons that increased or decreased the hue values in a two-
dimensional color space—so that it appeared gray to them. In
contrast to a simple categorization task (“Is this object yellow or
orange?”), this task does not necessitate access to color labels. For
objects without a prototypical color, participants performed quite
well and found an objective achromatic hue. But for objects with
a prototypical color, participants chose a hue that was opposite to
the object’s natural hue, so that the color of a banana was changed
to a slight bluish-gray instead of a truly achromatic gray hue. This
indicates that a banana that is objectively gray actually appears
slightly yellow. Although this task does not necessitate recruitment
of color labels, it is possible that they are nonetheless activated. It
appears that activation of object concepts also activates knowledge
of their color. For example, hearing the word banana activates the
concept “yellow” (Huettig & Altmann, 2004). Likewise, it is
probable that when a person sees a banana, the concept “yellow”
is also activated. So it is quite possible that declarative knowledge
about object color influenced perceptual decision making without
influencing perceptual encoding.
A different sort of indirect task has been developed in speech-
perception research. Phonetic research has shown that in compar-
ison with an unambiguous /sh/, an unambiguous /s/ makes a
following stop sound more like /k/ (rather than /t/; Mann & Repp,
1981). In addition, an ambiguous sound between /s/ and /sh/ is
perceived as /sh/ in fooli_ and as /s/ in christma_. So the question
becomes whether lexically induced percepts of /s/ and /sh/ influ-
ence the perception of a following stop as either /t/ or /k/ just as the
signal-based percepts of unambiguous /sh/ and /s/ do. This would
be predicted by a feedback to perceptual encoding account. Al-
though there have been some positive findings (Elman & McClel-
land, 1988; Magnuson, McMurray, Tanenhaus, & Aslin, 2003;
Samuel & Pitt, 2003), there is still some doubt that these findings
show top-down feedback (McQueen, 2003; McQueen, Jesse, &
Norris, 2009; Mitterer, 2007).
The studies summarized above—and in fact most of the existing
literature—have focused on questions about information flow—
that is, whether higher level information directly influences per-
ceptual processing. There is, however, a related—though logically
separate—issue: What kind of information mediates such object-
based biases? Or to put it another way, is the influence of world
knowledge on perceptual categorization mediated by declarative or
perceptual memory? It has long been accepted that human memory
is not a unitary system but that there are different forms of
memory, including perceptual memory about how things look and
sound, and declarative memory, such as the knowledge that ba-
nanas are called “yellow” (e.g., Blaxton, 1999; Squire, 2004). The
question we address is which of these two memory systems is
implicated in object-based biases. In the _ask example, is it ab-
stract phonological knowledge that can be consciously entertained
(e.g., that the word task starts with the same phoneme as the word
town), or is it the perceptual knowledge about what type of sound
precedes _ask—that is, knowledge that this sound tends to be a
high-frequency (in Hertz), high-amplitude burst. In the color do-
main, does a banana appear more yellow than it actually is because
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Figure 1. Four ways of accounting for the influence of memory on perception. The solid arrows show
uncontroversial flow of information, and dotted arrows show controversial connections.
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we know (declaratively) that “bananas are yellow,” as depicted in
the two lower panels of Figure 1? Or do we assume that the hue on
this banana is probably similar to the hues we (perceptually)
remember from encounters with other bananas, as depicted in the
upper panels of Figure 1?
The conundrum is that these two potential factors—declarative
and perceptual memory—are (nearly) perfectly correlated: The
perceptual memories of typical bananas correlate with the verbal
label that participants use to describe bananas. This is probably
why—as far as we are aware—previous research has not attempted
to tease apart the influence of these different forms of memory on
perception. Nevertheless, we identified a situation in which the
two factors can be separated: traffic lights in Germany and the
Netherlands. The topmost and bottommost colors of traffic lights
are described with the cognate color terms for green and red
(German: gru¨n and rot; Dutch: groen and rood), but the middle
light is subject to variation: Germans use their equivalent of yellow
(i.e., gelb), whereas the Dutch use the term for their color orange
(i.e., oranje). This diversity arises even though the perceptual
memories (at least of typical undergraduates) must be similar,
because traffic lights in the European Union are bound by a
European norm (EN 12368, Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normierung,
2006). This situation allows us to tease apart the contributions of
perceptual memory and verbal labels on perceptual decisions.
In line with previous work investigating the influence of world
knowledge on perception, we created a continuum of hues ranging
from a good yellow to a good orange (Ganong, 1980; Levin &
Banaji, 2006; Pitt & McQueen, 1998; Samuel & Pitt, 2003). These
hues were then used to color the middle light of a traffic light, and
observers were asked whether the hue was yellow or orange. We
hypothesized that if German participants call the hues on the
middle traffic light “yellow” more often than Dutch participants,
then the object bias in color perception stems from declarative
knowledge, because Germans call this object gelb (English: yel-
low), whereas the Dutch call it oranje (English: orange). If, how-
ever, perceptual memory of traffic lights induces the object bias in
color perception, the two groups should not differ in their “yellow”
responses, as they have similar exposure to traffic lights.
There is a caveat to this prediction. The color categories of
Dutch and German may not be identical, even though nearly all
color terms are cognate in the two languages. Several recent
articles have shown that color perception and processing are not
completely determined by (physiological) universals (Roberson,
Davies, & Davidoff, 2000; Winawer et al., 2007). So a difference
between Dutch and German observers in the number of “yellow”
responses to hues displayed on a traffic light would not necessarily
indicate different labeling of the traffic light colors but could be
attributable to a difference in the color categories of yellow
(Dutch: geel, German: gelb) and orange (Dutch: oranje, German:
orange) instead. To forestall this possibility, we included a color-
neutral stimulus (a sock) that was colored in the same hues as the
traffic light. If the color categories differ between the groups for
our stimuli, this should lead to a group difference for both the sock
and the traffic light stimulus. On the other hand, if a group
difference is observed only for hues on the traffic light stimulus, a
misalignment between Dutch and German yellow and orange
categories cannot account for the data.
In addition to the sock, we included a prototypically orange
stimulus (a carrot) and a prototypically yellow stimulus (a banana)
to replicate the object bias effect in color categorization. If both
Dutch and German participants give equivalent “yellow” re-
sponses to the traffic light and both groups give more “yellow”
responses to the banana than to the carrot, we have strong evidence
that the object bias in color categorization is caused by perceptual
memory. If instead Dutch and German participants give different
color responses to the traffic light, then the object bias in color
categorization is (at least in part) due to declarative memory.
Method
Participants
Thirty-nine volunteers participated in the study. All had normal
or corrected-to-normal vision and reported no color perception
impairments. Twenty were native speakers of German studying at
the RWTH Aachen University, Germany. Nineteen were native
speakers of Dutch from the subject pool of the Max Planck
Institute for Psycholinguistics, the Netherlands.
Materials and Procedure
All experiments were run in a completely darkened room with a
15-in. LCD monitor (Iiyama TXA3823MT) as the only source of
light. We generated a continuum of six hues from yellow to
orange. The Commission internationale de l’e´clairage (CIE) XYZ
coordinates of these hues were as follows: Hue 1: [60.0, 53.8, 8.5];
Hue 2: [61.4, 57.4, 9.0]; Hue 3: [63.9, 60.3, 9.4]; Hue 4: [65.7, 64.3,
10.2]; Hue 5: [67.6, 67.6, 10.8]; Hue 6: [69.8, 71.5, 11.5]. These hues
were then placed on four different pictures (see Figure 2): a traffic
light with the middle light being “on,” a sock, a banana, and a
carrot. These four pictures and six hues led to 24 experimental
stimuli. These stimuli were presented to the participants with the
Presentation software (Version 11.26).
Figure 2. The four stimuli used in this experiment.
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Participants were tested individually, facing the computer
screen. They were instructed to categorize the color on the objects
as “yellow” or “orange” by pressing the corresponding response
button. They were then presented with 15 blocks in which the 24
experimental stimuli were each presented once. Within each block,
the stimuli were randomly permutated.
Design and Analysis
In this experiment, we tested the extent to which the proportion
of “yellow” responses was influenced by the hue, the object
identity, and the native language of the observer. Given the cate-
gorical nature of the dependent variable, we used a linear mixed-
effect model with a logistic linking function (as suggested by
Jaeger, 2008) to predict the proportion of “yellow” responses, with
the factors hue, object, and native language of the observer as fixed
effects and observer as a random effect.
Results
Figure 3 presents the results as the percentage of “yellow”
responses. There was a tendency for the Dutch participants to give
more “yellow” responses to all objects but the traffic light. The
statistical analysis accordingly shows—besides the trivial effect of
hue—an overall interaction of Object  Native Language, F(3,
13939)  8.59, p  .001.1 We therefore ran separate analyses for
each object; the analyses showed no effect of native language for
the objects carrot, banana, and sock ( p  .1). There was, how-
ever, a significant effect of native language for the traffic light,
blanguage  Dutch  0.51, p  .05. We examined whether the
influence of native language differed between the steps by intro-
ducing a Hue  Native Language interaction, which was not
significant (p  .1). This may seem surprising, given the small
difference for the most yellowish hues, but it is important to
remember that small differences near the margins of a proportional
scale are (correctly) inflated by the logistic-regression method (cf.
Jaeger, 2008).
Disregarding the language variable, we found that there were
more “yellow” responses across the hues if the hues were on the
banana than if the hues were on the carrot, bobject  banana  0.47,
p  .001, and that there were more “orange” responses if the hue
was on the sock than if it was on the carrot, bobject  sock  0.29,
p  .001.
Discussion
In this experiment, we tested whether the influence of world
knowledge on perceptual categorization is caused by declarative or
perceptual memory. It was possible to tease these factors apart
because Dutch and German observers differ in their declarative,
but not perceptual, memory for traffic lights: Traffic lights are
bound to European regulations in both countries, but the Dutch call
the middle light oranje (orange), whereas the Germans call it gelb
(yellow). German observers categorized hues applied to the middle
traffic light as “yellow” more often than Dutch observers did,
whereas there were no significant differences between the groups
in color categorization for other objects. The difference in declar-
ative memory for traffic lights is the most likely cause of this
result.
There were two additional findings, one expected and one
unexpected, that are independent of native language. Both Dutch
and German participants gave more “yellow” responses for a
banana than for a carrot, in line with the world knowledge that
“bananas are yellow” and “carrots are orange.” It was unexpected,
however, that the sock object induced even more “orange” re-
sponses than the carrot. One explanation for this finding is a
possible difference in simultaneous brightness contrast. Yellow is
in general a brighter color than orange. The objects were displayed
on a dark gray background, which made their boundaries appear
brighter. Because the sock was the largest object in the line
drawings we used (see Figure 2), this contrast contributed a little
less to its overall appearance than it did for the slender carrot,
which may therefore have appeared brighter and more yellow than
the sock.
However, this possible effect of simultaneous contrast cannot be
the cause of the main result of this experiment: the difference in
“yellow” responses between Dutch and German observers for the
traffic light stimulus. The picture was, after all, the same for both
groups of observers. Could there be yet another explanation for the
observed difference between the groups? One possibility is that
color boundaries between yellow and orange differ between the
two groups. We ruled out this possibility by including non-traffic-
light objects. Any differences in color boundaries would have
influenced the responses on the other objects as well, but there we
did not find a difference between the two groups.
1 As the large number of degrees of freedom indicates, the statistical
method uses every single data point (39 participants  24 pictures  15
presentations). It is, however, not a simple logistic regression, which would
fail to take into account the fact that some of the data points are not
independent (i.e., those coming from the same participant). Baayen, Da-
vidson, and Bates (2008) showed that despite the large number of degrees
of freedom, the mixed-effect models are not prone to yield Type I errors.
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Figure 3. The proportion of “yellow” responses for the two groups of
participants, depending on the hue and the presented objects.
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The results seem to indicate that declarative knowledge and not
perceptual knowledge leads us to perceive the world in line with
our expectations. This is consistent with previous findings sug-
gesting that the perception of color relies on actively naming these
colors: Participants judge two colors from the same linguistic
category to be more similar to one another than stimuli from
different linguistic categories (a categorical perception effect).
Crucially, when the boundaries of color categories vary across
languages, performance is determined by language-specific cate-
gories rather than by perceptual distance (e.g., Roberson et al.,
2000). Although these effects by themselves could be mediated by
a language-induced, top-down reorganization of the perceptual
space, several recent findings show that these effects may instead
be mediated by an active recruitment of color labels. Categorical
perception is stronger in the right visual field than in the left visual
field (Drivonikou et al., 2007; Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006;
Roberson, Pak, & Hanley, 2008). This implicates an active role for
verbal labels, because the right visual field is projected to the left
hemisphere, in which most lexical knowledge is stored. Moreover,
under verbal—but not spatial—interference, categorical percep-
tion of color disappears (Gilbert et al., 2006; Roberson & David-
off, 2000; Winawer et al., 2007). Taken together, these findings
suggest that declarative memory has a crucial role to play in
perceptual decision making.
Obviously, we cannot rule out that perceptual memory has a role
to play as well. Nevertheless, the current data indicate that this role
may be rather minor. As it turns out, the effect of object identity
(banana vs. carrot) is very similar in size to the effect of language-
specific labeling for the traffic light stimulus. Both effects are
around 5% in the descriptive data, leading to a change of 0.5 in the
log(odds) in the statistical model. Hence, a labeling bias is suffi-
cient to explain the observed numerical difference in “yellow”
responses to the banana and carrot.
We have argued that verbal labels mediate the influence of
world knowledge on perceptual decision. In doing so, we contrib-
ute to the lively debate concerning the extent to which language
can shape thinking and perception (Davidoff, 2001; Davidoff, Gold-
stein, & Roberson, 2009; Franklin, Wright, & Davies, 2009; Gold-
stein, Davidoff, & Roberson, 2009; Kay & Regier, 2006; Levinson,
Kita, Haun, & Rasch, 2002; Li & Gleitman, 2002; Majid, Bower-
man, Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004). At first sight, our results are
clearly encouraging for a Whorfian view by showing that simply
calling an object “yellow” or “orange” influences how hues on
these objects are categorized. This dovetails well with the other
recent findings of color naming on color perception cited above,
which also indicate that verbal labeling influences color percep-
tion. However, the Whorfian view often implicitly assumes an
effect of language on perceptual encoding rather than on percep-
tion decisions. The merge model (Norris et al., 2000), which does
not postulate an influence of world knowledge on perceptual
encoding, is nevertheless sufficient to explain many Whorfian
effects. Consider Winawer et al. (2007), who showed that Russian
observers are faster to discriminate two hues if they are named
differently. The merge architecture predicts this result, as the
“different” response is suggested both by the perceptual evidence
and by declarative knowledge, which leads to a faster response
time than when declarative knowledge suggests a conflicting
“same” response. If verbal interference prevents declarative
knowledge from exerting an influence, only perceptual evidence
drives responses and the effects of language-specific color cate-
gories should disappear, as they do in the empirical data.
When putting forward a merge-type architecture, we do not
mean to trivialize the influence of language on perceptual tasks. In
line with the Bayesian view on perception (e.g., Norris &
McQueen, 2008), we think that it is crucial to use prior knowledge
in interpreting the world. The framework still allows for language
to influence how we interpret and react to the world in an online
and interactive manner in line with the claim of Winawer et al.
(2007). But this influence does not overwrite perceptual evidence.
As Norris and colleagues (Norris et al., 2000; Norris, McQueen, &
Cutler, 2003) pointed out, this is beneficial for optimal perception,
because world knowledge can then be used to overcome the
inherent ambiguity in perception—not only for a given stimulus,
but also for the functional recalibration of categories. Several
recent articles have shown how higher level knowledge is used to
recalibrate perception—for example, when there is a mismatch
between expected and observed perceptual information (Mitterer
& de Ruiter, 2008; Norris, Butterfield, McQueen, & Cutler, 2006;
Norris et al., 2003; van der Linden & Vroomen, 2007). If percep-
tual information were to be overwritten, the mismatch between
expected and observed information would go unnoticed and no
recalibration could occur.
In conclusion, we set out to investigate whether declarative
knowledge alone is able to influence perceptual decisions. Our
data show that it can. Moreover, our data indicate that perceptual
knowledge may not have an independent contribution to object-
based biases in perception. However, to conclusively demonstrate
this, future researchers need to explore situations that are the
mirror image of the one investigated here, where perceptual mem-
ory differs between groups but declarative knowledge remains the
same.
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